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Abstract 
The goal of this working paper is to organize and to clarify the multiple definitions currently 
being used to describe the principle of subsidiarity within the European context while at the 
same time highlighting the significance in variations between the “positive” and the 
“negative” interpretations of the term.  To gain insights into how politicians define the 
principle of subsidiarity, a survey was distributed to members of the European Parliament, 
the German Bundestag, and the Bavarian Landtag. The results of this project are collected 
and analyzed in the following paper and show that many of the “crude assumptions” 
regarding institutional predispositions towards defining the principle of subsidiarity prevail 
among many of the surveyed politicians. 
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Introduction 
 
Subsidiarity is the European Union’s old Swiss Army knife: flexible enough to 
apply to most policy issues, pointed enough to command caution, dull enough to 
never do serious harm, and always in its pocket. As with many concepts that gain 
prominence in the European political vocabulary, it takes time and practice for 
complicated ideas to gain a functional definition. Although subsidiarity dates back to 
the 17th Century, since its inclusion in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), this principle 
of governance has become a key concept for defining the relationships between the 
European Union (EU) and the member states. As subsidiarity has gained a more 
prominent role in European politics, it has also seen various interest groups 
effectively reform its meaning to suit their own needs or preferences. 
 
Such flexibility may be a curse, however. A brief survey of academic work 
currently utilizing subsidiarity as a key concept reveals that subjects as disparate as 
the European Research Area, governmentalisation and culture, fiscal federalism, and 
sub-regional governance are all relevant to the broader discussion.1 Furthermore, 
when reviewing the literature that discusses subsidiarity as a purely political principle, 
the word most likely to describe the term is “vague.”  Taken together, it becomes 
difficult to grasp what subsidiarity, in its contemporary iteration, actually means, what 
it is fundamentally used for, or what, if any, limitations constrain its political 
dispositions. Consequently, it seems that the European Union has embraced a 
principle of governance that is considered valuable strictly because it is a, 
“Euroconcept all can admire by giving it the meaning they want.”2 
 
 This malleability of meaning and ease of applicability has not inhibited 
scholars from making broad generalizations regarding the principle of subsidiarity. 
When discussing this subject matter, Ian Cooper asserts, “that national parliaments 
will defend subsidiarity because in doing so they also defend their institutional 
prerogatives.”3 He elaborates by claiming:  “This [statement] is based on the crude 
assumption that each institution will interpret subsidiarity in a way that most enhances 
its decision making authority. By this measure, national parliaments will favour a 
restrictive interpretation because they have the most to lose when powers are 
transferred to the EU level.”4 These assumptions, although commonsensical, have yet 
to face substantive, scientific analysis.  
  
                                                 
1Sonia Morado-Foadi, “The Missing Piece of the Lisbon Jigsaw: Is the Open Method of 
Cooperation Effective in Relation to the European Research Area?” European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
Issue 5 (September 2008): 635-654.;  Clive Barnett, “Culture, Policy, and Subsidiarity in the European 
Union: From Identity to the Governmentalisation of Culture,” Political Geography, 20 (2001): 405-
426.; Jacques Pelkmans, “Assessing Subsidiarity,” Paper presented at the conference “Subsidiarity and 
Economic Reform in Europe,“ European Commission, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Brussels, Belgium, November 8-9, 2006.; 
Allesandro Colombo, “The ‘Lombardy Model’: Subsidiarity-Informed Regional Governance,“ Social 
Policy and Administration, Vol. 42, Issue 2 (April 2008): 177-196. 
 2Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, “The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European 
Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994): 215-236. Quoting the 
Economist from July, 1992. pp. 220. 
3Ian Cooper, “The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing 
in the EU,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 44, No. 2 (2006) 281-304. 
4Ibid., 292-3. This quote comes from footnote 26 and the italics are mine, for emphasis. 
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To fully appreciate the principle of subsidiarity and its political consequences, 
it is necessary to unclutter the discussion. The goal of this working paper is twofold. 
First, it will outline many of the current definitions of the principle of subsidiarity.  In 
so doing, it will not only collect in a single document all of these variations on the 
theme, but it will highlight where the major areas of concord and conflict reside 
within these interpretations. Second, it will test the “gross assumptions” held by many 
social scientists, politicians, and technocrats. If history is an indicator, then we know 
that subsidiarity can be easily manipulated; therefore, it is necessary to locate some 
common, conceptual ground. If no common ground exists, and as Cooper states, 
certain levels of governance are inclined to hold starkly divergent points of view on 
subsidiarity, then in the interest of the European constituencies, these discrepancies 
should be brought to light. Either way, an analysis of this subject matter will help to 
clarify what politicians really mean when they use the term subsidiarity. 
 
To gain insights into the complex matters associated with the principle of 
subsidiarity, a survey has been distributed to members of the European Parliament, 
the German Bundestag, and the Bavarian Parliament. The purpose of this survey is to 
explore how acting politicians interpret the term subsidiarity and to observe any 
“institutional predispositions” that may determine how different groups of legislators 
define the concept. Following a literature review, the second portion of this paper will 
describe the methodology used to collect the data, followed by the final section which 
analyzes the results. 
 
 
The Vagaries of Subsidiarity 
 
Because comprehensive examinations of subsidiarity already exist,5 this 
section seeks only to briefly enumerate how scholars define the term, beginning with 
the most complicated explanations and working towards the simplest. Each 
framework originates from a different social scientific field of study, thus allowing 
this review to offer multiple perspectives of the same concept.  In collecting these 
ideas, it will be possible to expose the internal conflicts that exist within the literature 
and to simplify the rhetoric surrounding subsidiarity.  
 
During the following analysis, the term “center” will refer to what is 
commonly known as the central government and more specifically to Brussels and the 
EU supranational institutions. The term “sub-units” will indicate legitimate, lower-
level governments such as the member-states’ national parliaments and sub-regional 
legislatures.  
 
Andreas Føllesdal, the first scholar to be discussed, detects three different 
philosophical justifications for subsidiarity:  liberty, justice, and efficiency.  From two 
of these, liberty and justice, he distinguishes between two separate types of 
subsidiarity.  According to this framework then, it is possible for him to detail five 
discrete versions of subsidiarity in total.  
 
 
                                                 
5Andreas Føllesdal, “Subsidiarity,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 
1998): 118-120.; Ken Endo, “The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques 
Delors,” Hokkaido Law Review, XLIV/6 (1994): 553-652. 
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Table 1.  Føllesdal’s Framework for Understanding Subsidiarity 
 
 1st Principle 
 
Liberty                                   Justice                              Efficiency 
Althusian/Consociational Catholic Personalism Fiscal Federalism Types of 
Subsidiarity Confederal Liberal Contractualism  
 
Using liberty as a first principle, Føllesdal delineates the differences between 
the Althusian/consociational and the confederal types of subsidiarity. Both of these 
conceptualizations aim to protect the sub-units from centrist overreach, thus ensuring 
the liberty of the citizens by warding off the center’s propensity for intervention. 
Althusius developed his theory of subsidiarity based on the belief that, “communities 
and associations are both instrumentally and intrinsically important for supporting the 
needs of the individual.”6 As a Calvinist syndic attempting to balance the political 
autonomy of his people with the wishes of his Lutheran Lord and the Catholic 
Emperor, Althusius defined sovereignty as residing within the sub-units who then, 
conditionally, offered the central government their assent to be ruled. If the actions of 
the center were ever deemed illegitimate, then according to Althusius, it was entirely 
within the rights of the sub-units to rebel or secede.7  
 
Because Althusius focused on close associations such as guilds and 
communities, his was a territorial interpretation of subsidiarity which asserted that 
“the role of the state is not to regulate a political sphere separate from the social 
communities but to coordinate and secure their common purposes in symbiosis.”8 
Føllesdal recognizes in this definition the seeds of present day consociationalism, an 
organization of political groups that balances a pluralistic society by establishing a 
stable, pillarized government. While consociationalism and Althusian subsidiarity 
share much in spirit, they diverge in that consociationalism is a functional, not a 
territorial, organization of political units. In other words, according to consociational 
subsidiarity a functional group, for example Calvinists in 17th Century East Friesland, 
would not have to live in the same community or region to receive all of the benefits 
afforded them by Althusian subsidiarity; they need only to be similar in kind, not 
necessarily coterminous. As regards the European Union, territorial interpretations 
currently predominate, but there is no reason to believe that functional concerns could 
not become more relevant in the future. 
 
Confederal subsidiarity asserts that in order to capably defend the interests of 
the local constituency, the sub-units should maintain the right to veto any legislation 
originating from the center. In contradistinction to Althusius, confederal subsidiarity 
focuses mainly on individuals and not associations.  The threat of tyranny is of 
foremost importance; therefore, decentralization of power is necessary to keep 
individuals free by checking the powers of the center.  
 
In both Althusian and confederal subsidiarity, liberty is defined as non-
intervention, and the sub-units retain the right to exit the social contract at any time, 
                                                 
6Føllesdal 1998, 118. 
7Ibid., 118-120. 
8Ibid., 119. 
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either by force or by legislative measures.9 This quality is indicative of a 
“proscriptive” subsidiarity; that is, one directed towards limiting the activities of the 
center while preserving the competences of the sub-units.10 
 
According to Føllesdal, when subsidiarity originates from concerns of justice, 
it can be divided into a Catholic version based on personalism or a liberal 
contractualism meant to secure normative legitimacy for the state. The Catholic 
version of subsidiarity utilizes distinct definitions of the person (a social being 
striving to realize his or her innate potential) and the state (an institution that must 
abide by both natural and divine law) to inform its position.11 In Pope Leo XIII’s 
encyclical, Rerum Novarum, the Church asserted that the state has the legitimate right 
to act in order to safeguard the public good and to eliminate the suffering of a class of 
people; however, in order to maintain a just society, the state must always maintain 
respect for the individual and the family. Although there are some similarities 
between Catholic and Althusian subsidiarity, the acceptance, and even the 
requirement, of government intervention is nowhere to be found in Althusius and may 
be seen as the Church’s first step towards supporting the welfare state—an important 
detail when considering European subsidiarity.12  
 
On the other hand, the liberal contractualist position proposes that civil 
deliberation and democratic government will lead to a just organization of society. 
This version of subsidiarity envisions a reflective interaction taking place between the 
individual, whose character formation is altered as a result of engaging actively in 
political debate, and the institution, which becomes more representative and therefore 
more legitimate after considering the viewpoints of the sub-units’ constituencies.13 In 
both characterizations stemming from concerns for justice, the central government has 
a valuable role to play in social aspects of life, and therefore, limited intervention into 
sub-unit affairs is occasionally warranted.  
 
Finally, the philosophy of efficiency leads to a version of subsidiarity also 
known as fiscal federalism. Many practitioners of this type of subsidiarity use a 
“subsidiarity test,” or a cost-benefit analysis, meant to determine whether it is more 
efficient for a higher level of government to take over decision-making 
responsibilities within a certain policy sector.14 Fiscal federalism considers 
externalities and economies of scale when judging whether to transfer a competence 
to the center, but generally, the belief is that given a heterogeneous society, local 
citizens will be better attuned to the needs of their community and should therefore 
make decisions. An added benefit gained from such decentralization is system 
competition between levels of government. When state and local governments 
compete, each attempting to adequately provide certain services, efficiency is 
enhanced and policy consumers receive greater benefits. Of the versions of 
                                                 
9Ibid., 120-121. 
10Ibid., 116. “The principle of subsidiarity can proscribe central action in the absence of 
comparative efficiency, thus protecting the sub-units from intervention by the central unit.” Føllesdal’s 
italics. 
11Ibid., 123-124. 
12Ibid., 123-124. 
13Ibid., 125-126. 
14Jacques Pelkmans, “An EU Subsidiarity Test is Indispensable,” Intereconomics, Vol. 41, 
No. 5 (2006): 249-254. 
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subsidiarity discussed so far, fiscal federalism might be considered the most 
“prescriptive;” that is, when it becomes clear that efficiency may be improved, this 
interpretation requires the central government to mandate policy to the sub-units.15 
 
In each of these versions of subsidiarity, decentralizing decision-making 
processes lightens the legislative burden on the center and fosters a government that is 
“closer to the people.” Beyond these broad, and no doubt positive benefits, if put into 
practice, each of these interpretations would lead to a very different outcome for 
Europe. For example, one need only consider the stagnation and gridlock that would 
throttle the legislative process if, according to confederal subsidiarity, every sub-unit 
had absolute veto power. Consider also the ramifications if consociational subsidiarity 
were to gain discursive predominance. Could we imagine a Europe where a 
functional, non-territorial sub-group, such as Russian-passport holders or supporters 
of Sharia law, made efforts to exit the EU and the acquis communautaire based on 
claims of subsidiarity?  For these reasons, it is essential to reach an accord regarding 
which type of subsidiarity should prevail within the European Union.  
 
The second framework for analyzing the principle of subsidiarity comes from 
Neil MacCormick who approaches this subject from a philosophical and legalistic 
standpoint.  Primary to MacCormick’s thesis is the concept of a democratic 
commonwealth, an archaic term unearthed and re-contextualized so as to interpret the 
post-sovereign world of the EU.  As soon as the state admits to power sharing, or 
pooling sovereignty, the principle of subsidiarity becomes an appropriate means to 
answer certain questions: “Where [is it] best for the common good that a particular 
power be exercised, how far locally on a basis of local knowledge and understanding, 
how far centrally in a way that equalizes?”16 In organizing his thoughts on 
subsidiarity and democracy, MacCormick uses a two-by-two matrix. The horizontal 
axis is divided into individualistic or holistic categories and describes whether or not 
the democratic focus is on the person or on the group. On the vertical axis, the 
variables are instrumental or intrinsic—something done to create pleasure or 
something that is good in and of itself.  
 
Following this framework, certain philosophical positions become evident. In 
the individualistic/instrumental block observers would find Benthamites searching for 
the greatest utility, in the holistic/instrumental section one can discern Rousseau’s 
concern for the general will, and in the holistic/intrinsic portion, it is possible to see 
Aristotle’s belief that the common good is itself created during the process of 
deliberation.17 MacCormick does not weigh these concepts against one another but 
attempts to illustrate the level of complexity found in democratic institutions. Using 
this same matrix, subsidiarity can be similarly disaggregated. 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
15Føllesdal 1998, 116. 
16Neil MacCormick, “Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the ‘European 
Commonwealth.’” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Jul. 1997): 331-356. 
17Ibid., 348-50. 
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Table 2.  MacCormick’s Varieties of Subsidiarity 
 
 Individualistic Holistic 
Instrumental Market Subsidiarity (Economy-oriented) 
 
Rational Legislative 
Subsidiarity 
(Politically-oriented) 
 
Intrinsic Communal Subsidiarity (Civil Society-oriented) 
 
Comprehensive 
Subsidiarity 
(Transparency-orient.) 
 
 
MacCormick defines four types of subsidiarity. In the 
individualistic/instrumental quadrant he locates market subsidiarity, a concept that 
organizes the economy efficiently and increases society’s prosperity.18 As in the case 
of fiscal federalism, this version of subsidiarity is based generally on questions of 
efficiency, but in MacCormick’s typology, the individual’s freedom to make 
independent choices is more important than analyzing when the government should 
subsume certain market activities. In this interpretation, the individual is the “lowest” 
political level and should therefore be free to make decisions without governmental 
interference. 
 
The next type, what MacCormick describes as communal subsidiarity, shares 
many similarities with Catholic personalism. In both versions, individuals are seen as 
social beings with connections to their families, to their churches, and to their local 
organizations. Such relations are necessary for encouraging personal self-realization 
and individual fulfillment. Therefore, when determining which level of government 
predominates, the center should defer to the decision-making powers of these 
associations lest it interferes with their natural, socializing functions.19 
 
MacCormick locates rational legislative subsidiarity in the 
holistic/instrumental quadrant of his model. The ultimate goal for institutions 
adhering to this type of subsidiarity is to insure that collective judgments are widely 
satisfactory to their constituency and that they provide, “legal conditions for the fair 
conduct of commercial and industrial activity, without partisan distortion.”20 
MacCormick’s rational legislative subsidiarity creates a link between the market and 
communal concepts. Each concerns a specific social sphere, but the politically-
oriented subsidiarity must always measure its decisions based on considerations 
originating in the other two realms, making sure not to impinge unfairly on them.  
 
In the final quadrant, MacCormick labels the holistic/intrinsic form of 
subsidiarity comprehensive. While the first three types are sector-oriented, 
comprehensive subsidiarity acts as a macro-level understanding of the term focused 
on the public sphere as a necessary element for communication in an open society. By 
adding this concept to the matrix, he incorporates transparency, an essential quality if 
                                                 
18Ibid., 350. 
19Ibid., 351. 
20Ibid., 352. 
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the various segments within society are to constructively deliberate over where 
decision-making powers should rest. In a polity built on multiple levels of 
governance, comprehensive subsidiarity is necessary to ensure legitimacy because 
transparency guards against corruption and democracy demands inclusivity.   
 
MacCormick’s matrix does indeed illustrate the complexities of the term 
subsidiarity; however, within these complications exist the nuances which must be 
uncovered for the principle to gain a functional definition. Moving from a typology 
based on five definitions to one that uses four, certain similarities and differences are 
revealed. Because Føllesdal qualifies his definitions of subsidiarity with the attributes 
of prescriptive-ness and proscriptive-ness, he necessarily includes opposition and 
tension within his framework—some types of subsidiarity favor the center and others 
support the sub-groups. MacCormick, on the other hand, outlines a series of concepts 
that function symbiotically because each represents a different sector within the 
overall society. While all four have specific orientations, MacCormick has couched 
each in the language of democracy, thus making them philosophically compatible.  
 
In the next simplification, subsidiarity will be characterized as a set of three 
competing political ideologies:  Christian democratic, German federalist, and British 
Conservative. These draw more from history and politics than from philosophy or law 
and will resemble the modern versions of subsidiarity most contemporary observers 
are accustomed to discussing. John Peterson, in a moment of prescience, titled his 
1994 paper “Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision?”21 His introductory 
paragraph foresees some of the potential problems that arise when a term can mean 
everything to everybody. “Of course, the recent proliferation of interpretations has a 
downside, too. It has acted to confuse and obfuscate a concept which has the potential 
to guide clear-sighted, enlightened decisions about the future of European 
governance.”22 In a similar vein, Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, also publishing in 
1994, point out that, “both defendants of more authority at the Community level, like 
France and Germany, and opponents of such a development,” roundly supported the 
inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity into the Maastricht Treaty.23 This appears to 
be a political paradox—as the discussion turns to the actual and the pragmatic, the 
vagueness of the concept becomes even more pronounced.  
 
The Christian democratic variety of subsidiarity pays close attention to the 
small, autonomous social groups that participate in a pluralistic society. The role of 
the government in this system is only to provide for the public good and to establish 
legal order, not to subvert or overwhelm the social groups’ position within society. 24  
Furthermore, because of the variable role played by the state, this ideology is 
characterized by Peterson and by Van Kersberg and Verbeek as “dynamic.” When the 
situation calls for action, it is the state’s duty to protect its citizens; however, as soon 
as the problem has been rectified, it is equally incumbent upon the state to remove 
itself from the social arena. “Subsidiarity can thus be characterized as a theory that 
can be launched to justify both public intervention and the withdrawal of state 
                                                 
21John Peterson, “Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit Any Vision?” Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 
47, No. 1 (1994): 116-132. 
22Ibid., 116. My italics. 
23Van Kersbergen, Kees and Bertjan Verbeek 1994, 220. 
24Peterson 1994, 118. 
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activity. In this specific sense, it is a dynamic and historically sensitive, yet open-
ended, social and political theory.”25 
 
The German federalist ideology of subsidiarity, on the other hand, is 
considered static. It calls for an ordered, constitutional division of powers between 
each level of government and pays particular attention to protecting the lower levels 
from centrist intervention. While it is true that a minority of observers in the past has 
perceived subsidiarity as a stepping stone towards European federalism,26 and to be 
clear, such a rigid delineation of jurisdictions is a template for federalism, the 
contemporary consensus is that the addition of subsidiarity to the Maastricht Treaty 
was a crafty circumvention of the f-word.27  Therefore, such a rigid version of 
subsidiarity, what Peterson calls a “total concept,” is highly unlikely to gain 
acceptance among a broad section of either the European public or its politicians. 
 
The third political ideology that informs subsidiarity is the stance taken by the 
British Conservatives. Using Føllesdal’s terminology, this is a proscriptive definition 
that aims primarily at curbing any move towards centralizing power in Brussels. A 
highly defensive stance at odds with any understanding of integration that goes 
beyond issues of the Single Market, the British Conservative view could rightly be 
described as Eurosceptic. 
 
Within these three currents of thought reside multiple contradictory 
interpretations of subsidiarity and its application to the EU. On one hand, the 
Conservatives use this principle as a blocking mechanism to stymie any political or 
social integration. On the other hand, for the christian democrats, “the principle is 
intimately associated with the idea of socially embedding a market economy. In other 
words, Christian democrats already possess a well-defined theory on how to add a 
social dimension to Europe through the application of subsidiarity.”28 These two 
versions are located at extreme poles, using the same concept to justify positions that 
are diametrically opposed to one another. Add to the discussion the German 
federalists, those philosophically willing to conflate subsidiarity with federalism, and 
one truly understands the nature of Petersons’ “confusion and obfuscation.” It is no 
wonder that De Búrca refers to subsidiarity as a, “cloudy and ambiguous concept 
which is readily open to instrumental use.”29 
 
Given that a tripartite understanding of subsidiarity offers no more clarity than 
the more complex frameworks, maybe it is best to divide the principle in half. Given 
                                                 
25Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, 223. 
26Pedro Schwartz, “Is the Principle of Subsidiarity a Solution?” in François Goguel et al., A 
Europe for Europeans (London: The Bruges Group, 1990), 16-17.; Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, “Subsidiarity and the European Union,” NBER Working Paper No, 6556, (May, 1998).; 
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (London: Macmillan, 
1999). 
27 Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in 
the European Union,”Comparative European Politics, Vol. 2 (2004): 142-162. “To equate subsidiarity 
with federalism and to view the post-Maastricht development in terms of democratic 
federalism...therefore misses the important point that the adoption of the subsidiarity principle meant a 
narrow escape from federalism.” pp. 151.  
28Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, 230. 
29Grainne De Búrca, “The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional 
Actor,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1998): 217-235. 
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two choices, perhaps some greater understanding will be accessible. One of the most 
concise definitions of the term comes from Andrew Cox who interprets subsidiarity in 
a dualistic fashion. Cox defines a liberal viewpoint that places the onus on the center 
to prove that it has a legitimate reason to intervene. This view is very similar to that 
taken by the British Conservatives who attempt to maintain state sovereignty and to 
limit the role of the EU within the jurisdictions of the member states. He interprets 
this standpoint as being, “fundamentally opposed to the creation of a supranational 
federal EC structure,” that it, “seeks to use the concept of subsidiarity to limit the role 
of the EC,” and that this understanding could, “lead to the rejection of the very thing 
subsidiarity hopes to achieve.”30 Although Cox never enunciates what he believes 
subsidiarity “hopes to achieve,” it is clear that he does not believe that the framers of 
the Maastricht Treaty intended to include this principle as a means to discontinue the 
integration process or to hamstring the EU. 
 
For Cox, the supranational viewpoint contends that the center should set the 
political agenda. In this framework, it is assumed that the Commission and the other 
supranational institutions have superior legislative and executive capabilities and that 
sub-units, or member states, must prove that they can manage a certain sector better 
than the central government in order to retain competence in that area.31 Very clearly, 
the  principle of subsidiarity using this dichotomy becomes a highly contentious term. 
 
The scientific benefits gained from this type of binary relationship derive from 
the fact that each version originates from a very clear philosophical origin. The liberal 
version, or what Endo refers to as negative subsidiarity, asserts that power rests 
primarily with the member states; it, “refers to the limitation of competences of the 
larger organisation in relation to the smaller entity.”32 The supranational position, or 
positive subsidiarity, believes that the center acts as a catalyst for integration and 
given certain circumstances it has the obligation to intervene into the sub-units 
affairs.33 The proscriptive versus the prescriptive characterizations that Føllesdal used 
in his framework have become the key to unlocking the term.  
 
Going forward, this analysis will use Endo’s dichotomy of positive and 
negative subsidiarity as shorthand for defining whether a politician is oriented more 
towards the supranational stance (positive) or favors protecting the member states 
from excessive interventions (negative). These terms are inclusive in that many of the 
previous definitions may be described as either primarily positive or primarily 
negative. Althusian and confederal subsidiarity each depend heavily on veto power or 
exit strategies. Clearly, these belong to a negative interpretation of subsidiarity. 
Catholic personalism, Christian democrats, and some fiscal federalists believe it is the 
right and the obligation of the state to protect its citizens, even if this requires 
intervention. These perspectives are grounded in positive subsidiarity. 
 
                                                 
30Andrew Cox, “Derogation, Subsidiarity and the Single Market: The Case of Energy 
Exploration and Extraction under the EC Utilities Procurement Rules,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1994): 127-147. 
31Ibid., 136. 
32Ken Endo, “Subsidiarity and its Enemies: To What Extent is Sovereignty Contested in the 
Mixed Commonwealth of Europe?” European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, European Forum Series, RSC No. 2001/24 (2001): 1-42. Quote comes from page 6 
and the italics are Endo’s own. 
33Ibid., 6. 
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Given the ambiguous nature of the term subsidiarity, it is unwise to make 
absolute judgments about dividing the groups mentioned above into either strictly 
positive or negative camps. For example, while this binary system generalizes that 
Christian democrats and fiscal federalists support positive subsidiarity, it would not 
be surprising to find a faction within each of these groups that supported either 
populist, nationalistic rhetoric aimed at protecting their nation-state or an economic 
approach based on flexibility that might allow for an escape from the Single Market.34 
Such a system of classification is not meant to reduce this complex principle to a 
simple dichotomy, but it is an attempt to cut through the verbiage in hopes of gaining 
some clarity.  
 
Furthermore, this terminology is not meant to prejudice the reader. That is, it 
is not meant to connote that the supranational, European Union-oriented position is 
“good,” or positive, and the national, member state-oriented position is “bad,” or 
negative. This simplified understanding of subsidiarity was extremely helpful when 
developing the survey questions and attempting to quantify the parliamentarian’s 
responses. In the following sections, the methodology used to collect this data will be 
explained, and this dichotomous definition of subsidiarity will be put to practicable 
use. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This project began as a study of the European Parliament. The original goal 
was to discover which variables could best explain how and why certain politicians 
supported various positions on subsidiarity. Nine member states were chosen, and 
each of their Members of European Parliament (MEPs) were presented with a 10 
question, online survey.35 Unfortunately, the response rate was not high enough to 
draw even the most cursory conclusions. Several factors could have played a part in 
this. The survey was first distributed in November, 2009 and was available until 
January, 2010; however, with the Lisbon Treaty coming to force in December and the 
installation of a new Commission, the timing for such a survey may have been 
inauspicious. Furthermore, the online survey was presented in English which may 
have posed an obstacle to some MEPs. Nevertheless, the 30 responses were not 
enough. 
 
                                                 
 
34For an example of how economists may hold conflicting conceptualizations of subsidiarity 
please see Wolf Schäfter, “Harmonisation and Centralisation Versus Subsidiarity: Which Should Apply 
Where?“ Brugel, Intereconomics Sept./Oct. 2006.  In this article, Schäfter takes a highly positive view 
of subsidiarity when he states: “Accordingly, it is for the Commission to actively press for the 
necessary market liberalisation measures in the member states, even in the face of national resistance—
something it has been seen to have done, pointing the way forward, in recent years“ (p. 246). However, 
in his closing remarks, he states: “In addition, the principle of subsidiarity can be strengthened by the 
institutional anchoring of exit options for EU states and regions by legalising secession and opting 
out...In extreme cases even a legalised withdrawal from the EU should be made possible“ (p. 249).  
This shows that even in a single person may exhibit  both varieties of subsidiarity. 
35Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, and the Czech 
Republic were selected because, as a group, they represented various cross-cutting variables such as 
Unitary, Federal, or Devolving states, Large, Intermediate, and Small member states, and Original, 
Intermediate, or New member state. These were the variables that were to be tested. 
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When this problem became an evident stumbling block, the survey was 
translated 
into German and sent to each of the members of the Bundestag and the Bavarian 
Parliament. The survey was available to these institutions from December, 2009 until 
January, 2010 and the response rate was similar to that of the European Parliament—
26 members of the Bundestag and 32 members of the Landtag answered the survey. 
In total, the survey had produced 88 respondents. At least one MEP from every polled 
member state responded, and with the exception of Die Linke in the Bavarian 
Parliament, every major political party was represented in the Bundestag and the 
Landtag. 
 
The survey included three major types of questions. The first set of questions 
asked about the administration and possible benefits to be gained from subsidiarity, 
the second set was used to give each respondent a “subsidiarity score” between –5 
and 5 points, and the third set of questions was meant to produce a “support for the 
European Union” score ranging from –4 to 9 points. The goal was to locate each 
respondent on a coordinate system where the x-axis represented a “subsidiarity scale” 
and the y-axis measured support for the EU; after plotting all of the points, the results 
were meant to show the relationship between these two variables.  
 
The survey used filter questions which made it possible to gain a deeper 
understanding of the respondents’ positions. The score for the subsidiarity scale was 
generated by combining responses to four questions. Question 2 (Q2) was the first 
opportunity to position the respondents on the x-axis, the subsidiarity scale. Any score 
left of the origin indicates a negative view of subsidiarity, that is, one favoring a 
defensive stance focused on protecting states’ rights. Conversely, a score to the right 
of the origin means that the respondent holds a positive view of subsidiarity—one that 
supports interventions from the center given the proper conditions and circumstances.  
 
 Table 3. Question 2 
 
Q2:  Which of the following best describes your specific position on subsidiarity? 
a) It is necessary and useful as a tool to defend states’ rights against over-centralization. 
b) It is necessary and useful as a tool for stimulating deeper European integration. 
c) It is necessary and useful as a tool to defend the European status quo; that is, you neither favor 
devolving more power back to the states, nor do you support major steps towards deeper integration. 
d) None of these 
 
Answering (a) to Q2 would place this survey participant in the negative half of 
the coordinate system, answering (b) would place them on the positive side, and 
answering (c) would give them no score. In this model, the origin represents the status 
quo, not an absence of opinion, so any score of zero simply means that the respondent 
prefers the current political configuration to a more extreme alternative. In effect, this 
creates a third typology, which will be labeled “mixed subsidiarity.” Those 
respondents who are not strongly oriented to the negative or the positive but support 
the existing division of powers would fall into this category.36 
                                                 
36This practice of acknowledging both the positive and negative versions of subsidiarity is 
found in EU documents, and can therefore be understood as the “status quo.” In the current 
environment, neither extreme version has gained absolute predominance. The European Parliament 
Fact Sheet on Subsidiarity states: “The subsidiarity principle pursues two opposing aims. On the one 
hand, it allows the Community to act if a problem cannot be adequately settled by the Member States 
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The answer selected for Q2 determines which one of the next four possible 
questions (Q2a, Q2b, Q2c, Q2d) followed next. Question 2a, directed at those 
respondents in the negative half of the subsidiarity scale, attempts to determine the 
intensity of their negative views by asking the parliamentarians about their preferred 
level of veto power.  Because the strongest proponents of negative subsidiarity 
believe in full veto power, respondents holding this view would earn the most 
negative score. On the other hand, if the parliamentarian selects the answer to Q2a 
that asserts:  “States should have the opportunity to voice their concerns regarding 
pending regulations, but this need not be formally institutionalized,” then they would 
be on the negative side of the scale but with a score closer to the origin.  
 
The goal of this set of four questions was to determine the extremity of the 
respondents’ positions by giving them multiple chances to substantiate their views. 
Using this process, a subsidiairty score was derived for each parliamentarian.  
 
Graph 1.  Subsidiarity Scale Sub-Divisions     
 
 
 
The set of questions regarding support for the European Union situates the 
respondent on the y-axis. Drawing from the literature on Euroscepticism, this analysis 
utilized the Kopecky and Mudde two-by-two model for characterizing a respondent’s 
position towards the EU. This model is preferable to Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 
dichotomy of hard versus soft Euroscepticism because it offers greater variation.37 
The Kopecky and Mudde scheme uses two variables, support for European 
                                                                                                                                           
on their own. On the other, it seeks to uphold the authority of the Member States in those areas that 
cannot be dealt with more effectively by Community action.” If a respondent to the survey sees 
subsidiarity as having both qualities, then she will be labeled “mixed.”  European Parliament, “1.2.2 
Subsidiarity,” European Parliament Fact Sheets, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/1_2_2_en.htm. 
37Paul Taggart, “Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European 
Party Systems,” European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 363-388.; Paul Taggart and Aleks 
Szczerbiak, “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-based Euroscepticism in the 
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” in Pan-European Perspectives on Party Politics, eds. 
Paul Lewis and Paul Webb  (Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV:  2003), 23-41. 
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integration and support for the EU as a specific set of institutions, which enables it to 
differentiate between multiple types of Eurosceptic parties. Their typology also 
includes those people who support the EU, continental integration, or both—a 
significant classification for the current undertaking.38 
 
Table 4.  Kopecky and Mudde Model for Euroscepticism 
 
Support for European Integration  
Europhile Europhobe 
 
EU-Optimist 
 
 
Euroenthusiast 
 
 
Europragmatist 
 
Support for 
the EU 
As a Set of 
Institutions 
 
EU-Pessimist 
 
 
Eurosceptic 
 
Euroreject 
 
Because Kopecky and Mudde use a two-by-two model, translating its 
variables to a linear relationship required one major adjustment. To solve this 
problem, Europragmatists and Eurosceptics were given equivalent scores. By 
weighting them equally, this working paper avoided having to arbitrarily make one 
“higher” or “lower” than the other on the y-axis. Once the respondents are situated in 
the model, it is possible to color code and differentiate between these two groups in 
order to observe any relevant distinctions.  
 
Table 5.  Question 8 
 
Q8: Which of the following options best describes your feelings towards European integration: 
a) I support the European Union in its current form as well as the key ideas associated with integration, 
e.g. cooperation on the basis of pooled sovereignty and integrated liberal market integration. 
b) I support the European Union in its current form because of pragmatic reasons, but I am not necessarily 
committed to the ideas associated with integrations, per se. 
c) I do not support the European Union as it is currently constituted, but I am in favor of integration as a 
concept. 
d) I neither support the current form of the European Union, nor the ideas associated with integration. 
e) None of these answers describes my position. 
 
If the respondent answered (a) to Q8, then she would receive a score of 5 
points. If she answered either (b), (c), or (e) then she was given no points, and if she 
answered (d) she was given –1 point. In this way, Q8 divided all of the respondents 
into 3 groups: those who fully support the EU and integration, those who fully reject 
the EU and integration, and those who have some reservations regarding either 
integration per se or the institutions of the EU.  
 
  Respondents who answered (a) to Q8 were then asked about their level of 
commitment to integration. Do they support integration along political, economic and 
social lines? If the answer was yes to all three, then they were given an additional 4 
points, making the maximum possible combined score 9 points. Someone who 
strongly supports increasing political integration in order to compliment deeper 
economic integration but is not supportive of European social integration would 
receive an additional 3 points. A parliamentarian who favored slight political reform 
and the completion of the Single Market would receive 2 points, and if a respondent 
                                                 
38 Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde. “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on 
European Integration in East Central Europe,” European Union Politics, Vol. 3 (2002): 297-326.  
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was in favor of the current level of integration, then they received only 1 extra point, 
for a total score of 6 points.  
 
The Europragmatists and Eurosceptics received their own follow-up question 
regarding levels of future integration as well, and depending on how supportive they 
were, their total scores could range from 0 to 4. Parliamentarians who supported 
political, economic, and social reform were given more points than those who only 
supported reform in one or two sectors. Using this scoring system allowed the model 
to incorporate many of the diverse positions held by European parliamentarians 
including those who favor integration based on social and political issues, but not 
economic ones, and those who only support loose economic integration grounded 
firmly in the interests of the member states. As in the subsidiarity scale, scores closest 
to the origin were supporters of the status quo.  
 
The Eurorejects could score between –1 to –4 depending on how far they 
wanted to distance themselves from the EU. Those who proposed immediate 
secession were given the most negative score, while those who only supported 
extensive opt-outs were closer to the origin. 
 
Graph 2.  Kopecky and Mudde Identities and the Support for the European Union Scale 
 
 
 
Results and Analysis 
 
 This section will analyze each set of survey questions individually. The first 
group of questions asked the politicians about their feelings toward the administration 
of subsidiarity and the possible benefits associated with its implementation. These 
questions reflect general attitudes and uncover areas of consensus and disagreement 
among the surveyed parliamentarians. The second set of questions develops the 
subsidiarity scale. This is the heart of the analysis and should clarify the distinctions 
between the positive and negative perspectives; furthermore, from this data, 
institutional predispositions towards the definition of subsidiarity should become 
apparent. The third set of questions regarding support for the EU will be used 
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primarily as a means to complete the biaxial model and to visualize the relationships 
between this variable and the subsidiarity scale. 
 
Response Rates 
 
Because this survey was a not a random sampling of parliamentarians, it is 
necessary to compare the qualities of those who responded with those of the greater 
institution in order to determine whether or not the survey was representative.   
 
Table 6.  Member State Respondents from the European Parliament 
 
 % of EP % of Respondents Difference 
Germany 14% 40% +26% 
Italy 10% 10% 0% 
Spain 7% 10% +3% 
Poland 7% 7% 0% 
Belgium 3% 3% 0% 
Czech Republic 3% 3% 0% 
Austria 2% 17% +14% 
Denmark 2% 7% +5% 
Lithuania 2% 3% +2% 
 
Dividing the survey data into member states makes it possible to see how 
parliamentarians from each country were represented during this project. Germany, 
although having 14% of the seats in the EP, represented 40% of the respondents to the 
subsidiarity survey. This is a substantial disparity that may be explained by the fact 
that the current project is being conducted at a German research institute. Likewise, 
Austrian MEP’s were over-represented by fourteen percentage points. Italy, Poland, 
Belgium, and the Czech Republic showed no variation between their response rates to 
the survey and their percentage of seats in the EP, and the respondents from Spain, 
Denmark, and Lithuania were each within five percentage points. Although the survey 
results will be skewed to the German speaking countries, in most cases the responses 
aligned  closely to their actual percentages in the EP. 
 
The next table shows how well the MEP respondents corresponded to the 
party group fractions in the EP. When the data is organized in this manner, they show 
that the Socialists (the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
in the European Parliament) were under-represented by 12% and the Greens (the 
Group of the Greens/Free Alliance) were over-represented by 10%.  Each of the other 
party groups were within +/- 5% with the exception of the ECR (European 
Conservatives and Reformists), the only party group to register no respondents to the 
survey.  Because the majority of ECR representatives come from the British 
Conservative party, and the survey was not distributed to these MEPs, this lack of 
participation is not surprising. However, Polish MEPs represent the second largest 
bloc within the ECR, and while these representatives did have the opportunity to 
make their positions clear, no Polish ECR parliamentarians participated in the survey. 
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Table 7.  Party Group Respondents from the European Parliament 
 
 % of EP % of Respondents Difference 
EPP 36% 33% -3% 
Socialists 25% 13% -12% 
ALDE 12% 17% +5% 
Greens 7% 17% +10% 
ECR 7% 0% -7% 
United Left 5% 10% +5% 
Free/Dem 4% 7% +3% 
NI 4% 3% -1% 
 
It is important to remember that only thirty MEPs responded to the survey. 
With only a few exceptions, the respondents fit closely to their institutional 
representaton.  Where there are larger differentials between the respondents and the 
EP, these are not so extreme as to discount the findings of the entire survey.  Of 
course, a larger sample size would make the findings more robust, but using the data 
on hand, it is fair to say that most member states and party groups were represented 
sufficiently for this project. 
 
The next two tables show similar data for party affiliations in the German 
Bundestag and the Bavarian Landtag, the state parliament for Bavaria. The Social 
Democrat Party is over-represented in the Bundestag while at the same time the 
coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Christian Social Union is under-
represented. The other three party parties are within +/- 3% of their institutional. The 
sample size for the Bundestag included 26 respondents. 
 
 
Table 8.  Party Group Respondents for the German Bundestag 
 
 % of BT % of Respondents Difference 
CDU/CSU 38% 27% -11% 
SPD 23% 35% +12% 
FDP 15% 15% 0% 
The Left 12% 15% +3% 
The Greens 11% 8% -3% 
 
In Table 9, it is clear that the Christian Social Union was highly under-
represented in the Bavarian Landtag. The four other major parties were therefore 
slightly over-represented, ranging between +3% and +5%. When taking the two 
German parliaments together, in both cases, the CDU/CSU participated less than the 
other major parties and this non-response skews the data slightly. Because this 
coalition holds so many seats in both of these legislatures, it is unfortunate that their 
members did not play a larger role in the current project; however, the rest of the 
parties were adequately represented. 
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Table 9. Party Group Respondents for the Bavarian Landtag 
 
 % of LT % of Respondents Difference 
CSU 49% 34% -16% 
The Greens 10% 13% +3% 
FDP 9% 13% +4% 
Independent 
(FW) 11% 16% +5% 
SPD 21% 25% +4% 
Unalligned 1% 0% -1% 
 
 
Administration and Benefits 
 
 While the first section of this paper discussed many different variations of 
how scholars define subsidiarity, it did not mention one of the other, potentially more 
troublesome, dichotomies. As outlined by Granier de Búrca, even within the text of 
the Treaty, there are two competing versions of subsidiarity. On the one hand, there 
exists in Article 3b, a “narrow and legalistic” conceptualization that also includes the 
principle of proportionality and concerns mainly “comparative efficiency” within the 
legislative process.39 On the other hand, the famous, “decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen” clause found in the Preamble and Article A is mainly a 
political conceptualization that strips away technocratic jargon and re-defines 
subsidiarity in predominantly democratic terms.  
 
The first question of the survey presented the parliamentarians with the 
definition of subsidiarity as found in Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU)40 and asked them if this principle was, “a necessary and important component 
of the European political system.”  On this point, there was overwhelming consensus. 
In the European Parliament, 93% either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, 
in the Bundestag 88% either agreed or strongly agreed, and in the Landtag 97% 
agreed or strongly agreed. Of the 88 respondents, only one disagreed that subsidiarity 
was necessary and important (a Landtag member) and 4 people neither agreed nor 
disagreed. This result supports the assumption that subsidiarity is considered a 
guiding principle for European politicians as well as parliamentarians on lower levels 
of government. That legislators would gravitate towards the “legalistic” 
understanding of the term should come as no surprise. 
 
Later in the survey, the respondents were asked to answer a question regarding 
the more “politically” oriented version of subsidiarity found in the Preamble. 
Question 9 stated:  “The principle of subsidiarity, as defined by taking decisions ‘as 
                                                 
39De Búrca 1998, 218-220. 
40“In areas which do not fall within its executive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.”  The full text of the 
Treaty on European Union can be found here:  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html. 
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closely as possible to the citizen’ should be equally applied to sub-national and 
regional entities, not just nation-states.”  
 
Again, of those who responded to the survey, there exists a clear consensus 
regarding the affirmative application of subsidiarity to sub-national and regional 
entities. Upon first glance, this result is astonishing. Does this mean that the survey 
respondents would support the Lega Nord in its secession efforts? Would these 
parliamentarians also encourage Transylvania to form a separate Hungarian 
parliament within the borders of Romania? What about the Basques and the ETA? 
Agreeing on the legal foundations set forth in Article 3b is understandable, but to 
support subsidiarity as a means to embolden regional and sub-national political actors 
is a much more sensitive issue.  
 
 Føllesdal mentions this potential for draining powers from the member states 
and redistributing them to the regions,41 and Van Kersbergen and Verbeek also 
caution that subsidiarity could develop into, “an instrument of sub-national actors to 
challenge the national center.”42 When evaluating their predictions in a later article, 
the duo state that the Lega Nord, Scottish, and Welsh nationalist parties have all 
utilized the principle of subsidiarity, but that for the most part regional actors were, 
“confronted with the dominant interpretation according to which the principle of 
subsidiarity exclusively controls relations between Member States and the EU’s 
institutions.”43 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3. Question 9 Results 
 
 
  
After viewing the results for Q9, it is relevant to ask if this relationship 
between the member states and the EU concerning subsidiarity remains the dominant 
                                                 
41Føllesdal 1998, 114. 
42Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, 228. 
43Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2004, 155. Referencing Jackie Jones, “The Committee of the 
Regions, Subsidiarity and a Warning,” European Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1997): 312-326. 
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interpretation. Parliamentarians from three different levels of government support 
applying the principle of subsidiarity to sub-national levels of governance.  
  
One explanation for this result may be the “Boy Who Cried Wolf”-Theory. As 
the literature shows, many academics have already warned politicians about the 
increasing relative strength of regional actors; however, no sub-national has yet made 
a consequential effort to strengthen its political position vis-à-vis the state. For this 
reason, perhaps the politicians feel safe in supporting the “as closely to the citizen” 
clause because A) to do otherwise would be politically untenable and B) there is no 
impending challenge from a regional actor threatening to upset the status quo. As 
soon as the wolf appears however, the responses to this question can be expected to 
change. 
  
A second explanation is based on institutional logic. That is, it is incumbent 
upon the European Parliament to either agree or strongly agree with this version of 
subsidiarity because it is part of the Treaty that they are sworn to uphold. As for the 
Landtag, it also makes sense for these politicians to support the “closest to the citizen” 
ideal because, in very real terms, they are a “sub-national and regional” entity. In the 
Bundestag, the respondents show the greatest level of variation. About 20% either 
disagree or have no opinion on this topic. As will be seen in later discussions, the 
Bundestag appears to be caught in the middle on many issues. It must support the 
German federal states, but, as an ally of the EU, its representatives must also support 
the Treaty. Regardless of the reasoning behind these responses, the overwhelmingly 
positive consensus exhibited by the respondents was unexpected. 
  
When asked if subsidiarity is a tool for increasing transparency and decreasing 
the democratic deficit, the parliamentarians were also in agreement. In the EP, 70% 
either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, in the Bundestag 77% percent 
agreed or strongly agreed, and in the Bavarian Landtag, about 66% responded 
favorably. Across all levels of government, the majority of politicians believe that 
subsidiarity can increase the democratic standing of the EU. 
 
However, when asked to respond to the statement: “You believe that the 
principle of subsidiarity is currently functioning properly within the EU,” the results 
were not as consensual. In the EP, 30% agreed, but 30% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed, and 37% neither agreed nor disagreed. The Bundestag saw 16% agree, 
31% disagree, and 50% neither agree nor disagree. And in the Bavarian Parliament, 
16% agreed, 63% disagreed, and 19% neither agreed nor disagreed.  
 
Graph 4 illustrates that the EP perceives subsidiarity to be functioning much 
better than do the other two institutions. Conversely, the members of the Landtag 
seem to view the application of subsidiarity in a generally negative light. The 
Bundestag, again, is somewhere in the middle, with most of their respondents 
remaining non-committal.  
 
If all of the surveys are combined, it appears that only 20% of the respondents 
believe that the principle of subsidiarity is functioning properly. In other words, there 
is something approaching a negative consensus regarding the implementation of 
subsidiarity. Considering Questions 5 and 6 in tandem, it is possible to recognize that 
a foundation is being laid on which to construct a more democratic, more transparent 
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European Union; however, the tool that many view as being appropriate for shaping 
this development has yet to be properly actualized.  
 
 
 
Graph 4. Question 5 Results 
 
 
 
 The Lisbon Treaty will have an effect on solidifying the implementation of 
subsidiarity. Although the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), whereby member state 
parliaments have six weeks to offer a “reasoned response” to proposed legislation 
regarding its compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, was tested on a 
preliminary basis prior to December 2009, now that this process is encoded in the 
Treaty, its true capacity as a connective tissue between the member state legislatures 
and the Commission may be realized.44 With time, the review and revision of 
European directives (only as a check on their adherence to subsidiarity) by state 
parliaments may be the key to realizing the transparency and democracy gains 
achievable from a fully refined and institutionalized conceptualization of subsidiarity. 
  
When posed with a question regarding which institution should be the primary 
agency for monitoring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, the respondents 
tended to agree that the European Parliament should be the first choice, followed by 
the National Parliaments and the European Court of Justice. However, there was 
variable support for the other options which included the Council of Regions and an 
independent advisory board created especially for overseeing subsidiarity. The EWM 
would solidify these top two choices as “subsidiarity watchdogs” by bringing the 
member states into the legislative conversation, although only in an advisory capacity, 
and allowing the EP, now able to extend its influence via the expansion of the 
codecision process, to check the Commission if and when it begins to drift into 
unsanctioned policy areas. 
  
                                                 
44Ian Cooper, “The Subsidiarity Early Warning Mechanism: Making It Work,” 
Intereconomics, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2006): 254-257. 
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After being tallied, the responses from the first set of questions illustrate that 
most of the respondents viewed subsidiarity, whether it be the narrow/legalistic or the 
broad/political version, as integral to the political functioning of the European Union. 
Furthermore, they believe that this principle will increase transparency and reduce the 
democratic deficit. This would be quite a feat if, in the eyes of these politicians, the 
EU could manage to successfully incorporate this principle into the legislative 
process. Lacking this development, it appears that an unenthusiastic view of 
subsidiarity’s practicability prevails. Anecdotally, the data show that on many key 
topics, the parliamentarians have similar stances. This, however, is not the case, when 
these same politicians are placed into the subsidiarity scale. 
 
The Subsidiarity Scale 
 
 This section will use the previously discussed definitions of positive and 
negative subsidiarity in order to illustrate where different respondents fall along the x-
axis of this model. As stated, the subsidiarity score ranges from -5 to 5 and was 
derived by aggregating the responses to four separate questions. The text for Question 
2 can be found in Table 3. This question was meant to divide the respondents into 
three groups: those who felt subsidiarity was a tool to defend states’ rights (negative), 
those who felt that subsidiarity was useful for stimulating integration (positive) and 
those who favored that status quo; that is, they neither favored devolving power back 
to the states, nor supported steps to increase integration (mixed). 
 
 
 
Graph 5.  Results for Question 2 By Institution 
 
 
 
 The responses to this question align with Cooper’s previous assumptions. The 
Bavarian Parliament (Landtag) is strongly in favor of defending states’ rights.  
Conversely, he European Parliament perceives subsidiarity as an engine for 
integration. While almost 75% of those respondents from the Landtag view 
subsidiarity as a means to protect their sub-national interests, less than 25% of MEPs 
take this viewpoint. On the other hand, half of the MEPs believe that subsidiarity can 
aid in future integration and only 15% of Landtag respondents agree with this 
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position. When looking at this graph, the two separate definitions of subsidiarity 
become apparent. The principle of subsidiarity is being understood in two distinctly 
different ways.  
  
In the next question, the parliamentarians were asked to choose their most 
preferred level of veto power. The responses to this question are in Graph 6. This 
graph primarily illustrates that the Landtag has many more proponents of negative 
subsidiarity than the other two institutions. However, it is interesting that of the seven 
MEP’s who support negative subsidiarity, three do so “extremely” and agree with full 
veto power for member states; on the other hand, no respondent from the Bundestag 
chose this option. In the Landtag, only about one-fifth of the parliamentarians 
proposed full veto power. The majority favored the two less extreme options, 
preferring institutional cooperation and informal communication between the 
legislatures. Together, these questions seem to indicate that the term “states’ rights” 
may have elicited a robust initial response from a large group of the Landtag’s 
respondents, but when pressed, their stance was not overly negative.  
 
  
 
Graph 6. Levels of Veto Power 
 
 
 
 Of those respondents who believe that subsidiarity can stimulate greater 
integration (Q2), when asked a follow up question, 52% selected the option that 
stated: “Subsidiarity institutionalizes legal jurisdictions which are necessary for a 
functioning European political system based on multiple levels of decision making.” 
This result indicates two separate points. First, even those people who locate 
themselves on the positive side of the subsidiarity scale acknowledge that the 
European system has multiple levels of decision making, thereby admitting the 
importance of power sharing. This is important because it appears to soften the 
position. Second, they do not support positive subsidiarity because they believe that 
Brussels should manage all member state policies; instead, they see it as a way to 
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clarify when it is appropriate for Brussels to act. This is the key point for 
understanding positive subsidiarity. It does not mean that the EU should always act, 
but it accepts that supranational institutions have the legitimate right to do so, at the 
appropriate time. Just as the supporters of negative subsidiarity preferred a lighter 
touch when it came to veto power, the supporters of positive subsidiarity do not aim 
to run roughshod over the rights of the member states.  
  
In Question 3, the parliamentarians were asked how the principle of 
subsidiarity is best understood:  negatively, as a means to maintain states’ rights and 
avoid interference from Brussels; positively, as a justification for intervention when 
external costs become too heavy, when minority rights are threatened, or where 
efficiency is concerned; or mixed, a framework that allows limited interventions as a 
way to ensure minority rights and systemic efficiency but does not allow absolute 
state veto power. Graph 9 illustrates the results. 
 
 
 
Graph 7.  Results for Question 3 
 
 
 
What is most surprising about this graph is that the Landtag has a higher 
number of “mixed” responses than either the EP or the Bundestag. In both Q2 and Q3, 
the survey presented an option referring to states’ rights. In Q2, 75% of the Landtag 
chose the negative subsidiarity option. However, in Q3 only 22% percent selected that 
option, while 53% chose the mixed view. In fact, 19% of the Landtag selected the 
option for positive subsidiarity in Q3, slightly higher again than in Q2. The other 
institutions present similar dissonance. Graph 10 provides a comparison of the results 
between these two questions. 
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Graph 8.  Comparing the Results from Question 2 to Question 3 
 
 
 
Graph 8 has been simplified by including only those who selected either a 
positive, negative, or mixed position.  What it illustrates is a clear move towards 
mixed subsidiarity.  The number of Bundestag respondents favoring negative 
subsidiarity has dropped by over 50% and shifted towards the mixed category.  The 
Landtag has also undergone a dramatic reversal, its supporters of negative subsidiarity 
falling by almost 60%. Likeise, a similar shift from positive to mixed subsidiarity is 
visible in the EP.  This comparison supports the observation from Q2 which 
recognized that both positive and negative supporters of subsidiarity tended to be 
moderate in those beliefs. When allowed to choose directly, the majority selected the 
mixed option. 
 
 When these two questions are closely compared, the data reveal interesting 
details.  For example, only ten respondents selected the negative option in both 
questions, only one person chose the mixed option in both questions and only six 
parliamentarians consistently chose the positive option. In the vast majority, as can be 
seen from the strong response to the “mixed” option in Q3, their initial position 
moved towards the middle. Of the 88 people who answered the survey, only nine 
crossed signs, meaning that in one question they supported a negative version and in 
the next they supported the positive. In eight of those cases, the respondents went 
from negative to positive. Four of these crossed-signs came from the Landtag, three 
from the Bundestag, and two from the EP.  
  
Asking the same type of question in several ways makes the aggregate 
subsidiarity score less dependent on a knee-jerk reaction to key-words such as “states 
rights” or “integration.” Multiple responses from the politicians allowed this analysis 
to cut through some of the rhetorical noise. This was especially important considering 
that the model uses a zero value on the x-axis, not as a place holder, but as a 
legitimate response. After reviewing all four of the questions used to compile the 
subsidiarity score, it became necessary to distinguish between those people who left a 
question blank and those people who chose an option that reflected a mixed position 
on subsidiarity. Graph 9 illustrates the raw subsidiarity scores before taking non-
responsive surveys into account. 
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Graph 9. Raw Subsidiarity Scores 
 
 
 
The Gaussian siren-song is hard to resist when first encountering this data. 
However, it is important to control for false zeros. To be considered “non-
responsive,” the respondent had to leave both Q2 and Q3 blank. This occurred in only 
six out of the 88 responses. Given the already small sample size, it was judged more 
important to gain an accurate model at the expense of only six respondents rather than 
skewing the data because of non-response. Graph 10 demonstrates the aggregated 
subsidiarity scores after correcting for the false-zeros. 
 
 
 
Graph 10.  Final Subsidiarity Scores 
 
 
 
From these corrected data, the parliamentarians were next grouped into one of 
the five categories on the subsidiarity scale. The resultant graph is skewed to the left, 
indicating that the respondents generally tend to favor a negative view of subsidiarity. 
Unlike the other categories that only aggregate two possible scores, the mixed group 
counts three; that is, scores of -1, 0, and 1 are each included in this portion of the 
graph.  
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Graph 11.  Grouping the Subsidiarity Scores 
 
 
 
 
Does this choice skew the data by artificially increasing the number of 
respondents in the center of the model?  This, of course, was not the intention, but it is 
a justifiable question. As stated earlier, there were nine politicians who crossed signs. 
In each case, these respondents had a subsidiarity score of either -1 or 1. The mixed 
group allows the model to account for the small sub-set of respondents that appears to 
hold both views simultaneously—a strong sign of mixed subsidiarity. Indeed, these 
crossed signs represent 27% of the mixed group.  
 
The mixed group does deserve more attention, however. Using Graph 10 to 
take a closer look at the scores between -1 and 1, the data show that the mixed group 
actually trends to the positive. This indicates that those on the positive side of the 
subsidiarity scale skew to the center while those on the negative side, although 
moderate, are firmly entrenched in the middle portion of the negative half (-2,-3). 
 
When taken as a single group, the survey results reveal that a negative version 
of subsidiarity currently prevails among the survey respondents.  If the subsidiarity 
scale data are disaggregated into single institutions however, the granularity is 
increased, and the true nature of the divide between the positive and negative versions 
of subsidiarity becomes apparent. Each parliament displays their own distinct curve, 
and each has its own singular subsidiarity peak. 
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Graph 12.  Subsidiarity Scores for the European Parliament 
 
 
 
Graph 12 shows that the European Parliament peaks on the positive side of the 
subsidiarity scale. Its highest value is a score of 1 and its second highest is at 2. 
Because the mixed group includes scores of 1, this information was previously 
hidden. When fitting this data to the five-part grouping, the EP would be considered 
predominantly mixed; however, Graph 12 clearly indicates that the EP curve is 
skewed to the right. This data aligns with the previously cited document published by 
the EP which recognizes both versions of subsidiarity but affirms a slightly positive 
orientation. 
 
 
 
Graph 13.  Subsidiarity Scores for the Bundestag 
 
 
 
The subsidiarity scores for the Bundestag can best be described as lumpy. The 
peak at point 0 indicates that a group within the Bundestag holds a mixed view; 
however, the negative side of the graph is much heavier than the positive. This can be 
more easily illustrated when these data are grouped into the subsidiarity categories. 
The result is a much flatter curve than the EP’s—the highest point has only nine 
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respondents. Additionally, although Graph 13 seems to indicate moderation and a 
mixed position, Graph 14 is skewed to the left and reconciles the positive half to near 
irrelevance. 
 
 
 
Graph 14. Grouped Subsidiarity Scores for the Bundestag 
 
 
 
The subsidiarity scores for the Landtag tell a much different story than in 
either of the other institutions. Here the graph peaks at -2 and the second most 
common score is -3. Of greater interest is the precipitous drop-off between -2 and 
zero. Even the results from Q3 where the majority of respondents selected the option 
for mixed subsidiarity could not offset the generally negative interpretations held by 
the Landtag revealed in the rest of the survey.  These representatives are located 
resolutely in the negative half of the scale.  
 
 
 
Graph 15.  Subsidiarity Scores for the Landtag 
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 The differences between these parliaments’ positions on subsidiarity are 
unambiguous. When the data are grouped into the five subsidiarity scale categories, it 
appears that each parliament has its own distinct subsidiarity peak and tends to 
interpret this principle in its own separate way.  
 
 
 
Graph 16.  Subsidiarity Scores for Each Parliament 
 
 
  
Therefore, while many observers have assumed this to be the case, this 
analysis has made explicit the occurrence of “institutional predispositions” towards 
the principle of subsidiarity. The European Parliament is predominantly mixed but 
skews to the positive, the Bundestag has generally weaker views on subsidiarity and 
skews slightly to the negative, and the Landtag is strongly negative. In the analysis of 
the first set of questions, the parliamentarians tended to hold similar opinions 
regarding general perceptions of subsidiarity. This is not the case with the second 
group of questions. Adding the third set of questions that measured support for the 
European Union will complete the model. 
 
Support for the European Union 
 
Using the British Conservatives as a point of departure, this analysis 
recognized that party’s manipulation of the term subsidiarity as an opportunity to 
better understand who takes what position when instrumentalizing this concept. If a 
party devoted so fully to the protection of national interests and the concurrent 
obstruction of European integration could embrace this principle of governance, then 
what does this say about subsidiarity? The variable “support for the European Union” 
was selected because it offered an intuitive connection to the subsidiarity scale; 
parliamentarians favoring negative subsidiarity might also be relatively Eurosceptic 
while supporters of deeper integration may instead support a positive interpretation of 
the principle. Constructing the following model was meant to test this hypothesis. 
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As discussed in the second section, the “support for the EU score” was based 
on two questions. The first defined the parliamentarian as one of the four 
Kopecky/Mudde identities—Euroenthusiast, Europragmatist, Eurosceptic, or 
Euroreject. The follow-up question then asked about preferred for levels of 
integration. In the end, the respondents were given a score between -4 and 9. Graph 
17 illustrates the results. 
 
Because multiple respondents ended up with the same scores, it was necessary 
to use the actual point, say (-2,7), as an organizational center around which to locate 
all of this score’s respondents. Because of this, there are clusters around each relevant 
score. For example, at the (0,9) and (2,9) locations, there are six points, and around 
the (1,9) and  
(-3, 7) locations, there are five points. This method was judged to be the least biased 
way to visualize the data.  
  
Three things stand out about Graph 17. First, it is divided along the y-axis 
between the top half north of point 6, and the bottom half, south of point 6. In terms 
of the scoring system for the y-axis, anyone having more than four points is 
considered a Euroenthusiast, and anyone with less than four points is either a 
Eurosceptic or a Europragmatist.  This division among the data is quite clear. Sixty 
percent of the respondents located themselves above the point 6 watermark, making 
the graph generally top heavy, favoring the Euroenthusiasts.  
 
 
 
Graph 17.  All Respondents Modeled for Subsidiarity Score as Related to Support for 
 the European Union 
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This pertains directly to the second point; the trend line fit to this data is 
slightly positive, which means that the stronger the support for the EU, the more 
positive the parliamentarians’ stance on the question of subsidiarity.  This finding 
supports the hypothesis. Furthermore, those with the most negative subsidiarity score 
also have very low support for the EU scores. The positive relationship prevails in the 
model even though no respondent scored a 5 on the subsidiarity scale. In fact, the 
trend line is upward sloping even though there is a wide dispersion of subsidiarity 
scores among those scoring 8’s and 9’s in their support for the EU score. There are 
significant clusters in the negative subsidiarity/Euroenthusiast portion of the model [(-
3,7);(-2,7);(-2,9)]. Again, this model reiterates what most of the literature has stated 
before: the principle of subsidiarity can be used to suit any vision of the European 
Union. 
 
Finally, the third insight to be gained from this graph is that no respondent 
located themselves within the Euroreject portion of the model.  It is presumed that one 
who rejects both the EU and integration would be less likely to engage in a survey of 
this type. In any case, this paper can make no remarks concerning Eurorejects and 
subsidiarity because no parliamentarian having this characteristic completed the 
survey 
 
The data can be re-organized to distinguish between the Eurosceptics and 
Europragmatists. After correcting for non-response, fifty-five respondents identified 
themselves as Euroenthusiasts, sixteen as Europragmatists, and nine as Eurosceptics.  
 
 
 
Graph 18.  Distinguishing Between Europragmatists and Eurosceptics 
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The Euroenthusiasts are all found above the five level of the y-axis and trend 
slightly positively. Surprisingly, the Eurosceptics, those who approve of integration 
but do not support the EU as a set of institutions, also show a positive relationship, 
one stronger in fact than the Euroenthusiasts. Despite this fact, three of the six 
respondents with a subsidiarity score of either -4 or -5 were Eurosceptics. The 
Europragmatists display a negative relationship meaning that the greater the intensity 
of support for negative subsidiarity, the higher the support for the European Union. 
This finding validates the Kopecky and Mudde terminology. Only the most pragmatic 
nationalist could hold this viewpoint; that is, one who needs and understands the 
benefits gained from the EU but simultaneously asserts the states’ right to sovereignty 
aptly characterizes a most realpolitik politician.  
  
 
 
 
 
The next series of graphs will visualize the relationship between these 
variables and the three parliaments. 
 
Graph 19.  The Relationship Between Subsidiarity and Support for the European Union 
in the European Parliament 
 
 
 
The first institution to be analyzed will be the European Parliament. Graph 19 
illustrates two main points. First, the European Parliamentarians that responded to the 
survey show a very strong, positive relationship between these two variables. Second, 
the EP has a very wide variation in opinions. In fact, this institution holds the most 
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extreme positions in both variables—the most positive and negative positions on 
subsidiarity as well as the most positive and negative opinions on the European 
Union. When judging this data against the hypothesis, it confirms that in the EP, 
positive positions on subsidiarity correlate with supporting the EU as an institution 
and a set of ideas. 
  
The next graph situates the respondents from the Bundestag within the model. 
This graph supports much of the previous analysis regarding the parliamentarians 
from Berlin and their uncertain stance on questions of subsidiarity. The trend line 
indicates that there is almost no relation between these two variables for the 
Bundestag. Those who have 0 scores on the y-axis could have almost any subsidiarity 
score, ranging from  
-3 to 2. Likewise, the distribution of subsidiarity scores for Euroenthusiasts ranges 
from  
-4 to 4. Given the small sample size, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the 
Bundestag, but from the responses to this survey, it appears that further study is 
necessary in order to understand the Federal Parliament’s relationship to subsidiarity. 
 
 
 
Graph 20.  The Relationship Between Subsidiarity and Support for the European Union 
in the German Bundestag 
 
 
 
 In the analysis up to this point, the data have shown that the respondents from 
the Landtag have a staunchly negative position on subsidiarity. When the second axis 
is added to the model, the results are consistent with the previous findings; 
furthermore, they support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between positive 
subsidiarity and support for the EU, or conversely, negative subsidiarity and 
opposition to the European Union. 
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 The trend line in Graph 21 indicates a positive relationship between these two 
variables within the Landtag. As in the other two institutional graphs, the majority of 
the respondents are located in the top half of the model which means that even in the 
regional parliament, politicians exhibit relatively Euroenthusiast tendencies. 
Furthermore, the negative half of the subsidiarity scale is home to many more 
respondents than the positive side. This only adds further evidence to the claim that 
the Landtag is largely an institution which holds to a negative view of subsidiarity. 
 
 From these three graphs, it is possible to ascertain distinct pictures for each 
parliament. The EP is highly distributed across all sectors of the model, but its 
politicians tend to reveal a positive relationship between subsidiarity and support for 
the EU. This same relationship can be found in the Landtag, but the graph looks much 
different because of the heavy majority of the respondents who support negative 
subsidiarity. And finally, the Bundestag demonstrates almost no relationship between 
these two variables, making it difficult to draw many conclusions regarding this 
institution. 
 
 
 
Graph 21.  The Relationship Between Subsidiarity and Support for the European Union 
in the Bavarian Landtag 
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Conclusions 
 
 This discussion of subsidiarity has analyzed the definitions that legal scholars, 
political scientists, and philosophers use to understand the term. It has also attempted 
to bring to the forefront one of the main ideological differences between these 
definitions; that is, this analysis has shown the importance of distinguishing between a 
positive and a negative version of subsidiarity. This difference is crucial. If politicians 
leading multiple different levels of government use the same term towards different 
ends, then the ultimate losers will be the citizens caught in the cross-fire of 
misunderstanding. 
  
Ian Cooper supposes that an institutional logic among parliaments will prevail. 
He assumes that the national legislatures will define the principle in a way that 
strengthens their position vis-à-vis the supranational institutions.  Cooper uses the 
terms “restrictive” and “permissive” as distinguishing characteristics that describe 
particular stances toward subsidiarity—expressions this paper has labeled negative 
and positive subsidiarity, respectively. However, in discussing these terms, Cooper 
describes his own characterizations as “crude,” while concurrently stowing his brief 
discussion of this critical point in a footnote. This paper has not only contextualized 
and elaborated on these terms by placing them within the spectrum of multiple other 
definitions of subsidiarity, but it has also tested the assumptions made by Cooper.  
The results to those tests support what many have, to this point, taken for granted. 
 
The conclusions gained from this survey ultimately confirm Cooper’s 
hypothesis. When situated within the subsidiarity scale, institutional predispositions 
indeed occur. The curve for the EP is distinctly different from the curve for the 
Bundestag, which in turn looks very little like the curve for the Bavarian Landtag. 
The major difference between Cooper’s suppositins and the results of this survey was 
that instead of the national parliament holding the most negative interpretation of 
subsidiarity, it was the regional parliament that did so.   
 
When discussing the EWM and the logic of arguing, Cooper proposes that 
inter-institutional discourse over issues of subsidiarity will eventually lead to a 
convergence in the definition of the term. This analysis agrees with Cooper’s 
interpretation of the discursive future of subsidiarity. The data collected during this 
survey indeed show a shift to the mixed version of subsidiarity. As Van Kersbergen 
and Verbeek note, subsidiarity was introduced into EU parlance by Christian 
democrats holding a staunchly positive view and hoping to expand the powers of the 
supranational institutions.45 Only over time has the negative view of the definition 
become ascendant, and this was mainly due to popular backlash against the 
Maastricht Treaty. With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the EWM, the 
opportunity for member state parliaments to review proposed legislation for breaches 
of subsidiarity should make the legislative process more open and transparent. This, 
according to the survey respondents, is widely considered one of the benefits to be 
gained from subsidiarity. Furthermore, with such openness, there is no reason for the 
national parliaments to retreat into a defensive stance; they may in fact shift further 
towards a mixed interpretation of subsidiarity. Graph 16 portrays this intermediate 
step, a Bundestag curve located somewhere between the EP and the Landtag. 
                                                 
45Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 1994, 217-219. 
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 Regional governments, such as the Landtag, adhere more closely to Cooper’s 
assumptions about restrictive/negative interpretations of subsidiarity. This working 
paper has shown clear data to support this point. Is it possible that with time, the 
Landtag’s point of view will also converge with the mixed version of subsidiarity?  
Will there be a Europeanization of subsidiarity in that the dominate interpretation will 
emanate from Brussels and then spread to the lower levels of governance within the 
multi-tiered system? To support such an idea is to refuse the historical record. The 
principle of subsidiarity has proven to be very supple over the years. To think that all 
parties will find and adhere to a single definition may be too much to ask. 
Furthermore, what would the Landtag have to gain from such convergence? In many 
ways, by unequivocally accepting the EU’s rights to intervention, it may actually 
forfeit its claims to be included into the deliberative process. Therefore, it is doubtful 
that a complete convergence will come to pass, but the process appears to be 
occurring slowly at the European and Bundestag levels. 
 
 In conclusion, this working paper has revealed that on many points there is a 
convergence of opinion regarding the institutional characteristics necessary to make 
the principle of subsidiarity a functional concept. However, it has also shown that 
there are institutional predispositions towards interpreting this term that may make 
meaningful communication about this subject difficult. If regional parliaments such as 
the Bavarian Landtag maintain a predominately negative stance towards subsidiarity, 
they will continue their efforts to preserve their own power at the expense of deeper 
integration. This is an outcome at odds with the narratives of integration and multi-
level governance.  A resolution must be found which encourages sub-regional 
governments to feel as though subsidiarity is a means towards developing 
partnerships and not simply a tool for absorbing local competences. By explicating 
the dual definition of subsidiarity, it should make members of each institution better 
able to understand where the actual conflict resides. In fact, they are closer to a 
common definition than one might think. Many of the parliamentarians who support 
negative versions of subsidiarity also recognize that a mixed version is appropriate at 
times, just as the majority of those respondents on the positive side of the subsidiarity 
scale identify strongly with the mixed category. This shows that room exists for 
advanced dialogue, and that those who use subsidiarity solely as a blocking 
mechanism or a means to delay the integration process are in the fringe minority. 
Given time and the institutional stream-lining expected to take place with the signing 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity may in fact undergo another 
discursive re-definition. Instead of being a tool for the Christian democrats to direct 
the EU towards supranationalism or a mechanism for the British Conservatives to 
confound Brussels, perhaps the new interpretation of subsidiarity will be based on the 
mixed view—one that attempts to use the principle’s flexibility as means to bridge 
those two extremes and to satisfy the political needs of the European citizen by 
finding the appropriate decision-making instrument for each specific policy proposal.  
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